Historically, attachment theory and psychoanalysis have been uneasy bedfellows. The reasons for this are many and complex, and it is relatively recently that progress has been made in integrating this "black sheep" of the psychoanalytic community back into the fold (Fonagy, 2001). Because scepticism remains about the claim to membership of a theory that has been influenced by nonpsychoanalytic approaches (evolution, ethology, control systems and cognition) it sometimes needs to be restated that attachment theory is a branch of psychoanalysis. In understanding human development and behaviour it takes account of unconscious processes, defence mechanisms, the formation of an internal world of object relations and the relationship of reciprocal influence that exists between this and the social environment of the individual. Today, attachment theory research is providing 1 Correspondence should be directed to Christopher Clulow, Ph.D
Historically, attachment theory and psychoanalysis have been uneasy bedfellows. The reasons for this are many and complex, and it is relatively recently that progress has been made in integrating this "black sheep" of the psychoanalytic community back into the fold (Fonagy, 2001) . Because scepticism remains about the claim to membership of a theory that has been influenced by nonpsychoanalytic approaches (evolution, ethology, control systems and cognition) it sometimes needs to be restated that attachment theory is a branch of psychoanalysis. In understanding human development and behaviour it takes account of unconscious processes, defence mechanisms, the formation of an internal world of object relations and the relationship of reciprocal influence that exists between this and the social environment of the individual. Today, attachment theory research is providing an empirical basis for many of the clinical assertions made by practitioners of psychoanalysis.
At the heart of attachment theory lie two interrelated propositions that apply to the adult couple, as well as to the nursing couple: the felt security of an individual is a product of social relatedness; the development of social relatedness is a product of the felt security of individuals. Herein lies the paradox of partnership: intimate involvement with others is a precondition for developing a capacity to be alone; the capacity to be alone is a precondition for developing intimate involvement with others. Herein also lie the different starting points of attachment and object relations theories (individuation as a product of intimate relating) and Freudian dimensions of ego psychology (primary narcissism giving way to intimacy) in charting human development.
Intimacy has been defined as "making one's innermost self known, sharing one's core, one's truth, one's heart, with another, and accepting, tolerating the core, the truth, of another" (Cassidy, 2001, p. 122) . Since the development of intimacy is at the very heart of the psychoanalytic enterprise, and the capacity to be intimate is related to secure attachment, psychoanalysis has reason to be informed about attachment theory. However, a further problem in effecting a rapprochement has been that for psychoanalysis the site of learning about the vicissitudes of intimacy has been clinical practice, whereas for attachment theory it has predominantly been empirical research.
Insofar as attachment theory has become associated with a tradition of observational research, doubt has been raised about its claim to share the same field of concern as psychoanalysis. There is a vigorous debate in psychoanalytic circles about the relevance and utility of observation for therapeutic practice. On one side of the debate there is the argument that unconscious processes and the transference cannot be "seen," in any observable sense, but only experienced within the clinical setting. Meaning results from the processing of experience, and therefore what is of importance follows rather than accompanies events. Everything of clinical interest is then contained in the "après coup." From this perspective, observational research falls outside the psychoanalytic paradigm and constitutes a potential threat to "the spirit of psychoanalysis, the specific mental state that inhabits the psychoanalyst during his or her work and thinking" (Green, 2000, p.26 ). An alternative view is that from the earliest stages of infancy there is a capacity for intersubjectivity that can be captured in the present "moment of meeting," and that this present fleeting moment contains aspects of an experienced past and anticipated future that may be communicated through enactments and patterned behaviour. The difference then is between a "psychology of presence," infant observation focusing upon an interaction, and a "psychology
